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Tis book contributes to a respectable and ever-enlarging body of studies of twentieth-century tonality. 
Emerging from a conference of the same name at Duke University in 2010, the dates in its title seem both
to invite and to discourage the expectation that the book will provide some kind of historical overview. 
Te introduction repeatedly refers to ‘the 1900–1950 period’, but it is not immediately obvious what 
constitutes this as a period in musical or general historical terms. Had the dates been 1908–45, then we 
might suppose that the period between Schoenberg’s Second String Quartet and Britten’s Peter Grimes 
could be considered a moment of frst contact between centuries-old tonality and its most viable modern
alternatives. As it happens, the music – the ‘practice’ – examined in the book ranges from 1913 (Vaughan 
Williams’s London Symphony) to 1959 (Barber’s Nocturne), and the theory – the ‘concept’ – from 
Schoenberg’s Harmonielehre (1911) to Hindemith’s late thoughts in the 1960s.1 Although it does not ofer 
a historical conspectus, then, the book presents a sequence of ffeen case studies covering the 
development of both theory and composition in the frst half or so of the twentieth century, written by 
scholars from four countries (mostly the United States and Germany, but with Belgium and Switzerland 
also represented).
Te editors open with the observation that tonality ‘achieved crisp theoretical defnition in the 
early twentieth century, even as the musical avant-garde pronounced it obsolete’ (p. 11). Tey have in 
mind Schoenberg, Kurth, Riemann and Schenker, although the last is given much less attention than the 
rest. I shall return to these theories in due course, for now simply noting that although each of those 
theorists had their own idiosyncratic, even mutually incompatible, view of what tonality ‘was’, for each 
tonality was singular. Te same is not necessarily true for composers, and many of the chapters in this 
book focus on what the editors insist is a ‘plurality’ of tonalities, or even ‘a prismatic formation’ (ibid.) 
which became not ‘a quasi-natural foundation of music’ but simply one technique among others (p. 17). 
Tese available techniques are treated in a number of chapters, each considering the music of a diferent 
country in isolation. Although there are three chapters on British and German music, it is the cases of 
France and the United States that questions of nation are the most striking. 
Marianne Wheeldon notes, in her chapter on Milhaud and Koechlin’s defence of tonality, that 
some French musicians found atonality in general (Poulenc) or Pierrot lunaire in particular (Milhaud), to 
be ‘shit’ – thereby prefguring the considered refections of some of my undergraduates by almost a 
century (pp. 145–6). But what they actually meant by this (and in this they join hands with some 
modernism-phobic Anglophone musicologists today) was that it was German. It was specifcally to 
rescue polytonality from being labelled style boche that Milhaud stressed its French origins (pp. 147–8). 
Tere is much more of interest concerning polytonality in this collection, and I shall return to it later. 
Remaining for the moment with nationalism and aesthetics, however, it is interesting that views of 
atonality in the United States were no less colourful than in France. But the US picture was complicated 
by the fact that the country provided a home both to emigré German theorists (and composers) and to a 
number of home-grown tonal composers, so that the question of cultural cross-fertilisation manifested 
less as a suspicion of a neighbour and more as openness (or hostility) to immigration. Broad questions of
transatlantic relations therefore provide an important background to Wolfgang Rathert and Beth E. 
Levy’s chapters on music in the United States.
Rathert’s narrative echoes mid-century constructions of the myth of American exceptionalism in
that country’s broader discourse. He describes Charles Seeger’s ‘dissonant counterpoint’, for instance, as 
‘an American equivalent of Schoenberg’s twelve-tone method, a breakthrough to a musical language 
divested of any inkling of tonality’ (p. 68), while reminding us that Roger Sessions is sometimes labelled 
‘the “American Brahms”’ (p. 70), whose critique of Krenek’s thoughts on new music ‘anticipates the 
position adopted in [Adorno’s] Philosophie der neuen Musik’ (p. 72; Rathert does not explain the details of 
that anticipation). While Milhaud was openly nationalistic, what we fnd here is diferent, and more 
characteristic of mid-century American history writers such as Daniel Boorstin:2 the implication that 
everything of signifcance to modernity – in this case both twelve-tone composition and post-
dodecaphonic tonality, in the compositional arena, and Adornian theories of modernism in the critical 
one – was invented independently in the United States, without the need of foreign intervention. 
Quotations from composers and other scholars in Levy’s chapter clarify this perceived diference 
between Old and New World attitudes, which is essentially a binary of nature (the United States) versus 
manufacture (Europe). For instance, Roy Harris implied (pp. 247–9) that European developments were 
driven by parti pris commitment to whatever a composer deemed to be the relevant ‘ism’, with the 
principal question being whether to be pro or contra atonality, while implying that in the United States, 
by contrast, compositional decisions were made by instinct. Tis spirit infects scholarship too: Levy cites 
Larry Starr, who has ‘astutely’ written that the music of American composers like Gershwin and Copland 
was ‘incidentally “tonal” by virtue of the character of its basic material […] rather than as a consequence of
adherence to any preordained philosophical tenets’ (p. 247). Tat assertion sits comfortably with 
American myths of naturalness, honesty, democratic openness and a resistance to the ‘isms’ of Old 
Europe, but it is pure make-believe. Aesthetics, like politics, is always value-laden, and never neutral; in 
fact, the only thing more political than writing a manifesto is not writing a manifesto. Harris’s frequent 
appeals to nature and opposition to artifce, which are illuminatingly documented by Levy, are therefore 
as disingenuous as the claim, from a bigot, that ‘I don’t go in for politics at all, and I’m not getting involved
in any anti-feminist arguments or anything, but I just think that women naturally belong in the home’. 
Te bigot may honestly think that he is not being political, but he is, and unless Gershwin and Copland 
had absolutely no idea what art music had been written since 1908, they too, like Harris, were ‘guilty’ of 
making an aesthetic choice.
Attitudes towards tonality and its relationship to atonality are therefore revealed, generally 
without explicit signposting by the volume’s authors, to be fascinatingly bound up with the early 
twentieth century’s ideological confgurations. Te specifcally nationalist questions ultimately recede 
into the background, but the more general and less easily historicised matter of ideology does not.
Te main line I will pursue is that tonality in the twentieth century was a dialectical formation, 
and that a dialectical analytical method (which is not the same as a varied analytical method, since the 
requirements are more precise) will ultimately prove to be the best way of understanding it. For the most 
part, the music in this volume concerns itself with the dialectical relation between handed-down tonal 
practices and currently available methods of non-diatonic or entirely non-tonal composition; but in one 
chapter, it operates between handed-down forms and twentieth-century technology.
For Joseph Auner, technology fgures more as a metaphor than as a deeply theorised problematic 
in modernity.3 Tus, although Walter Benjamin’s famous essay on music in the age of mechanical 
reproduction is cited,4 neither it nor any other critical theory of the relation between humanity and 
technology is brought to bear. Auner conceives of technology more or less naively as a neutral feature of 
modern existence, and one which for his purposes has three principal infuences on composers’ attitudes 
to musical materials: by encouraging ‘weighing’, ‘measuring’ and ‘embalming’, each of which receives a 
section so headed in the chapter. An example of ‘weighing’ is the modernist attitude towards pitch 
organisation, so that ‘what for Bach and Mozart were passing “accidents” – the result of surface 
contrapuntal elaborations frmly tied to an unmistakably inferable triad background – have become for 
Schoenberg absolute entities warranting theoretical investigation and explanation in their own right’ (p. 
33). In other words, to weigh a dissonance is to emancipate it. ‘Measuring’ relates variously to 
manipulation of note rows and to consequences of ‘measuring time through recording technology’, 
including Cage’s experiments with silence. ‘Embalming’ is the process by which recording enables 
possibilities for literal sampling and the writing of collages, on the one hand, or recording-infuenced 
compositional ideas such as Satie’s ‘static loops that threaten to go on forever, as in the 840 repetitions of 
Vexations’ (p. 42), on the other.
Te connections are interesting, but despite Auner’s insistence that he does not ‘mean to imply a 
narrow technologically deterministic model linking the introduction of specifc devices to changes in 
musical style’ (p. 28), there is a slight whif of the parlour game here. Te fundamental intellectual shif 
that Auner connects to twentieth-century technology is that ‘instead of categorizing sounds in terms of 
their manifold sources (voices, instruments, natural events, etc.), a focus on the transductive properties of
the membrane allowed all acoustic phenomena to be understood as vibration’ (p. 31). But at least two 
important difculties must be addressed. First, the observed switch from sources, which in most cases 
means real and embodied historical humans, to vibration is not the kind of change that should pass 
without further remark. It is an extraordinary and historically particular abstraction of the essence of 
music, refecting an already well-established pattern in the historical development of capitalism, in which
relations between people (listening and performing subjects: humans) are concealed by relations between 
things (listening and performing objects: machines). Te confrontation between music and technology is 
not neutral in any way, but the feld of sound studies – of which this article is the sole representative in 
this volume – either does not care about the radical circumscription of music as ‘sound’ which recording 
technology encourages, or else delights in it. In some situations – the sale of musical commodities and 
the use of music in torture – sound is important, but in others, not. One does not have to be a Marxist to 
raise an eyebrow at sound studies’ reduction of music to sound, when it is ontologically much more 
complex than that, and capable of being composed, thought about, discussed, written about, analysed, 
remembered, imagined, banned or wielded as a totem of emancipation without sound getting the 
slightest look-in.5 Auner presents his topic as a shif in ways of conceiving sound, but he is wrong because
he is already presupposing a capitalist conception of music as sound in the frst place. He seems unaware 
of the ideological commitment he makes in his starting point. What is at stake is the radical 
impoverishment of the multiple being of music into the singular being of mere sound. Intellectually as 
well as morally and politically, the technological and economic switch to the focus on sound is 
something which requires the most serious investigation.
Secondly, technology can be used in more signifcantly diferent ways than Auner suggests. All of 
his examples are more or less direct metaphorical transpositions from technology to music, which is to 
say that for him a technological possibility results in an analogous musical invention. Te idea that 
humans might engage with, even challenge technology rather than naively use it on terms dictated by 
that technology is not really interrogated. Yet it is clear that a relatively technologically controlled, 
abstract musical object such as Stockhausen’s Gesang der Jünglinge is radically diferent from the human-
centred, technologically interactive musical subject of Boulez’s Répons. Makers of objects which are 
abstracted from human and historical contexts (i.e. reifed) are quite evidently working with technology 
in ways that are importantly diferent from people for whom technology is a contemporary, present, 
onstage interaction between humans and machines. But Auner neither ofers examples which tend more 
towards a critical engagement with technology nor seems to entertain them as possibilities. 
Consequently, his chapter does not consider what the implications might be of transforming tonality 
from something that works between humans into something abstracted from human historical context 
and made ‘natural’ as vibration. Tere is the beginning of an investigation here, but it is a severely limited 
one.
So much for the dialectic of ‘nature’ and technology; the dialectic of ‘nature’ and history receives 
more extensive treatment in the volume. Te imperative to confront the ideological efects of this 
dialectic might, as we have seen, have been lost on Harris, but it was not lost on Schoenberg, who in a 
sense made it the heart of his music theory. In ‘Concepts of Tonality in Schoenberg’s Harmonielehre’, 
Markus Böggemann cites a passage from that treatise in which Schoenberg theorises the necessity of the 
self-destruction of the tonal system.
It is remarkable: the vagrant chords [in an example of Mozartian cadential patterns]
do not appear directly by way of nature […] . Actually they arise only out of the logical
development of our tonal system, of its implications. Tey are the issue of inbreeding,
inbreeding among the laws of that system. And that precisely these logical
consequences of the system are the very undoing of the system itself, that the end of
the system is brought about with such inescapable cruelty by its own functions, brings
to mind the thought that death is the consequence of life. (p. 107)
Tis seems more precise than a general post-Hegelian view of historical process. Substitute ‘crises’ for 
‘vagrant chords’ and ‘ideology’ for ‘inbreeding’ in this paragraph, and this might be Marx arguing for the 
inevitable collapse of capitalism under the weight of its own internal contradictions. But what 
Schoenberg and Marx failed to foresee was the resilient capacity of tonality (or capitalism) to fold its 
contradictions back into itself as a source of strength, to use the emancipation of dissonance (or the 
collapse of a fnancial system) as a means of generating an inexhaustible range of more complex and 
appealing tonal novelties (or the re-enrichment of the capitalist class).6 While this productive digestion of
contradictions is one of the strong themes of this collection, it is not always as well realised by some of 
the authors as it might be. Too ofen the assumption that a contradiction means self-destruction goes 
unexamined, as I shall show later. But before leaving Schoenberg, it is worth noting a remark by Stephen 
Hinton, in his account of Harmonielehre, concerning its second chapter. I suggest that it points to a 
signifcant obstacle for analysts of twentieth-century tonality, specifcally concerning the need for a 
dialectical approach to analysis – a challenge which is only partly met in this book. 
In some ways, in the passage that Hinton cites, Schoenberg makes a very small point – but it 
ramifes. Schoenberg argues that the instrumentation and voicing in bar 382 of his Erwartung will 
encourage listeners to hear this eleven-note chord (only D<natural> is missing from the chromatic 
aggregate) as one that ought to resolve to a diminished seventh. Its failure to provide that resolution will 
strike people as doing ‘no more damage here than when the resolution is omitted in simple harmonies’ (p.
116). Tat is, Schoenberg suggests that listeners will hear this as a dissonance which ‘ought’ to resolve but 
does not, and will not hear it as in any sense emancipated (that being an idea he had yet to formulate). In 
his own Harmonielehre, Schenker would not have been so sanguine about the efects of this chord, but one
could certainly imagine him, even without yet having the fully developed machinery of the Ursatz to 
hand, struggling to interpret the chord in relation to a horribly failed tonicisation.7 In this sense, and 
irrespective of its metaphysical or ideological burden, the core of Schenkerian theory is as alert as 
Schoenberg (or, later, Adorno) to the inheritance of historic subjectivity in the contemporary listener, 
which is still conditioned by nursery rhymes, hymns, pop songs, and so on.8 Hinton observes that 
Schoenberg’s (and, I would add, Schenker’s) analytical attitude ‘is a far cry, indeed, from […] set-theory 
nomenclature, which proceeds from the assumption of “atonality”’ (p. 117). When there are at least two 
plausible ways of analysing a chord or a progression – one appealing, as Schoenberg and Schenker do, to 
traditional tonal harmony, another to pitch-class set theory – there seems to be no a priori reason to 
favour one over the other. I suggest, however, that there are good reasons to presume a frm tonal basis 
and only entertain the possibility of an alternative when all tonal explanations have utterly failed.
If the historical subjectivity of listeners is such that they will be enculturated to hearing tonally 
(and for the last few centuries, that has been the case), then music will have to veer a considerable 
distance away from tonality before those listeners give up any hope of bringing their experience of the 
music back into tonal order. Locked into a dialectical mediation of ‘nature’ and ‘history’ in this way, 
tonality is therefore just as much an ideological construction as attitudes to gender or race.9 Tonality is 
extremely resilient to challenge and will tend to draw strength from its own contradictions – although, 
like all ideological felds, it is possible for it ultimately to be replaced by another. Te reason Adorno 
initially supported atonality and serialism (and later denounced serialism as a new form of aesthetic 
totalitarianism) was that he consistently argued for musical composition to resist ideology,10 and tended 
to favour the form of musical material which he felt best ftted the present historical needs of that 
struggle. No aesthetic or moral value judgement is implicit in the observation that tonal music in the 
twentieth century is positioned diferently in respect of that musical-ideological feld than post-tonal 
music is, or to observe that the gravitational pull of the tonal ideology is even stronger on tonal than on 
non-tonal music (i.e. Erwartung has a fairly easy ride, but even it is potentially tugged at tenaciously by 
tonality). Terefore, while analysis of twentieth-century tonality should not simply seek to reduce 
individual musical processes to an orthodox Schenkerian background, it would be equally – or actually 
more – false to proclaim too quickly the success of strategies of resistance to tonality. If hexatonic and 
other symmetrical conceptions of chromatic space could truly imperil tonality, then possibly by Schubert
and defnitely by Wagner tonality would have been quite dead. Tat it was not even plausible to suggest 
that it might be in danger until the emancipation of dissonance is a hugely signifcant ideological fact in 
the history of music. Tus, the essence of the dialectical method for analysing twentieth-century tonality 
is the need to move continually between irreconcilable poles, each mediating the other: on the one hand, 
the orthodox, diatonic prolongation of the tonic triad, and on the other hand, constructions of musical 
space which tend to cut against diatonic prolongation. To slightly refne the opposition set up by 
Dahlhaus, it is to establish an analytical dialectic of ‘centrifugal’ forces (generally speaking, a harmonic 
palette derived from any kind of symmetrical division of the octave, which hexatonic and pitch-class set 
theory are well placed to describe) and ‘centripetal’ forces (generally speaking, diatonic harmony, whose 
structuring principles are most comprehensively described by Schenker).11 Favouring either pole over the
other will simply tend to exaggerate the reading of a piece’s tonality in one way or another, allowing the 
historically constructed listener’s response too little or too much infuence on the analytical reading.
I shall turn back now to the various forms of tonality examined in this book, whose efects on 
listeners I claim that analysts must somehow examine with both historical and ideological sensitivity. In 
the case of the amateur music following the Neue Musik Berlin festival of 1930, which is the subject of 
Scheideler’s contribution, it is a designedly bland and archaic tonality; and in the case of Bruno Stürmer, 
who was published by Schott, it was ‘specifcally the modality of the seventeenth-century homophonic 
four-part chorale (Kantionalsatz)’ (p. 210). In this case, a dialectical reading may appear to be unnecessary,
since ‘non-tonal’ elements seem unimportant, but refection on what we might call ‘the state of the 
dialectic’ in music like this can enable a historical, critical or even ideological interpretation to emerge 
from the analysis. For instance, in Levy’s chapter, Harris’s constant appeals to nature reveal an ideological 
commitment which belies his (and some of his interpreters’) attempt to plead innocence of any such 
thing. He argued, for instance, that symmetrical subdivisions of the octave were unnatural, ‘symptoms of 
man-made artifciality that ran counter to organic unfolding’ (p. 253). Tis is typical of people who 
consider themselves impervious to ideology: having (rightly) identifed the manufactured nature of 
whole-tone, octatonic, hexatonic and serial thinking, Harris simply declines to interrogate the 
manufactured basis of his own practice. His favouring of one side of the dialectic – the diatonic, 
centripetal pole – is an explicit rejection of any possibility of non-tonal structuring, which marks him out
very signifcantly from composers who are willing to reach some kind of accommodation between 
opposing systems. Which is another way of saying that there is conservatism and conservatism. When 
confronted with the radical challenge of communism, some propose social democracy as a means of 
reconciling the call for public ownership with the existing structures of capitalist society. Tat is a 
‘conservative’ response, but it is worlds away from a refusal to countenance the call for reconfguration at 
all, and to seek to follow the neoliberal logic of total privatisation. If we are sensitive to the dialectic of 
twentieth-century tonality, fne distinctions between ‘conservative’ responses to new musical realities 
become possible.12 
Some uses of tonality, however, are signifcantly more adventurous than the Stürmer and Harris 
examples, and the chapters by Mark Delaere on polytonality and Daniel Harrison on Barber’s ‘tonal 
serialism’ trace two intriguing forms of them. Harrison’s is particularly successful at outlining the 
dialectical tension between the two organisational principles, tonal and serial, in Barber’s Nocturne. Te 
frst note row of the piece, which Barber uses as the melody above a non-serially organised lef-hand 
nocturne accompaniment, is composed of three [0127] tetrachords, motivically presented, with very 
clear accents, so that the melody sounds like an augmented triad which has been flled in with fligree 
chromatic decoration between each ‘node’ (pp. 264–5). Te tension between the serial design of the 
theme, which is ‘heard’ as a row by a listener who has been tipped of that it is one, and the tonal space in 
which the theme and its accompaniment move is illustrated by a voice-leading graph which shows a bass 
arpeggiation of a tonic triad, A<fat>–C–E<fat>, in the A section, decoration of the bass E<fat> in the B 
section and a resolution to A<fat> in the modifed repeat of the A section (p. 263).
Delaere frames his chapter with a joke, saying that in writing about Milhaud’s polytonality, he ‘can
assure the guardians of public morals and decency that [he] will not make a plea for polymorphous 
perversity’ (p. 157, cf. the reference to the same in the closing sentence on p. 171). Delaere is referring here
to Wilfred Mellers, who in the Times Literary Supplement in 1989 described Milhaud’s use of the technique
as ‘a tribute to Nature’s polymorphous perversity’ (cited p. 157). It is not clear that Delaere spots the 
reference, but this is simply Freud’s term for the infant stage of sexual development, a period before erotic
pleasure has been particularised to the genitals and where it is therefore experienced in all parts of the 
body.13 As a description of polytonality, Mellers presumably meant to indicate that it was music which 
gives pleasure without having a single focal point, and as such the description could be perfectly apt.
Delaere provides an informative summary of French theories of polytonality, beginning with 
Milhaud,14 in which he requires that polytonal voices be exclusively diatonic, admitting of modulations 
only on condition that they should be ‘straightforward and unambiguous so as not to disturb the diatonic
quality of the music’ (cited p. 159). Developing these thoughts, Charles Koechlin prizes polytonality for 
‘its potential to produce a plethora of sensual and emotional impressions’ (which should perhaps already 
put us in mind of polymorphous perversity), and interestingly he recommends ‘the use of one 
unambiguous tonality at the beginning of a polytonal composition’, which suggests a clear dialectical 
positioning between centripetal and centrifugal poles (cited p. 161).15 
One is tempted to ask whether, as conceived in 1920s France, polytonality is really, so to speak, a 
refracted chromaticism, a verticalisation of a chromatic variety within a tonal hegemony that is, in other 
styles, presented horizontally. Being of limited chromatic interest, the individual tonalities are in fact 
quite underdeveloped: tonality is a more capacious concept than the individual strands are willing (or 
able) to explore. Perhaps it overstates matters to claim that because the diferent keys only gain full and 
interesting tonal development when considered as a whole, their vertical separation amounts to a kind of
pseudo-individuation. On the other hand, the simplicity of the diferent key areas does suggest a childlike
aesthetic, and the Freudian implications of polymorphous perversity are therefore substantiated by 
Delaere’s clear delineation of its theorisation (particularly in a six-point set of criteria given on p. 163). So,
in short: if the tonality of each contrapuntal strand is no more developed or more curious in its 
explorations than a piece by the seven-year-old Mozart, we might indeed call its component parts 
childish, giving pleasure from a number of areas, not yet fxing on one in particular, and thus ftting 
Freud’s view. Tis is a matter which analysis could examine by considering the tension between a 
Schenkerian reading of any global tonal structuring (bearing in mind Koechlin’s recommendation for 
unambiguous tonic framing) and its mediation by the centrifugal forces of its polytonal contrapuntal 
strands. Deleare’s use of Mellers’s words in the context of his rich chapter therefore makes me feel that it 
would have been even more fruitful for him to have taken the joke seriously.
Richard Cohn’s remarks on listener perception of hexatonic transformations, familiar from his 
earlier writings,16 are particularly interesting in this psychological context, not least because he actually 
invokes Freud in support of his theory. Having observed that tonality does not inhere in the notes but is a
communal construction on the part of a community of listeners (p. 47), Cohn claims that for this 
community of listeners (he does not defne it precisely, but I think it is safe to assume that he means early 
twenty-frst-century students of Western classical music), ‘hexatonic poles destabilize the consonant 
status of one or both constituent triads’ (p. 51). By ‘hexatonic pole’ he means, for instance, the shif from E 
major to C minor, a parsimonious chromatic movement between chords which have no pitches in 
common. He observes that, in the case of this particular motion, 
the interval comprising the perfect ffh, here E to B, is […] heard to grow by two
diatonic degrees. What is notated as the consonant E<fat> to C is perceived as
D<sharp> to C. But that is a dissonant interval; and so the second chord must be a
dissonant chord. Te ear is caught between the desire to hear the chord as a consonant
triad or as a species of diminished seventh. Te progression thus erodes a cardinal
musical binary, between consonance and dissonance. Such leaks in boundaries that
one had thought secure are a mark of the uncanny [which he links directly to the
Freudian notion of the unheimlich]. (Ibid.)
Although by the end of this exposition Cohn is careful to say that ‘the ear is caught between’ two 
interpretations, I am not sure on what basis he states more baldly that the C minor chord is heard as 
containing a D<sharp>. I have tried this example on half a dozen of my own students, and although the 
sample size is too small to draw any defnite conclusions, the fact that not one of them ‘heard’ anything 
other than two triads is enough to focus the mind. If we turn Cohn’s observations on the community of 
listeners back onto his own analysis here, we might conclude that the only such community which might 
be assured of hearing the motion is a community which has been conditioned (or, to use Schoenberg’s 
term, ‘inbred’) by hexatonic theory to listen in that way. It is ironic that only a page earlier Cohn had 
criticised theorists who ‘make’ hexatonic progressions ft into a diatonic tonal frame, yet here makes 
something which could very easily be read simply as diatonic into something that is ‘uncanny’. Both he 
and his straw man may be letting their theory run away with them. What I mean here is more or less 
captured by Dilthey’s distinction, cited in Felix Wörner’s chapter on Ernst Kurth, between verstehen 
(understanding), which is the interpretative work of history, and erklären (explaining), which is the 
descriptive work of science (p. 128). Hexatonic analysis, like pitch-class set analysis, does an excellent job 
of explaining how the music comes to have the pitches it does in a technical sense, but understanding 
requires further steps.17 
Tis assumption that the hexatonic is privileged relative to the diatonic guides the rest of his 
chapter, which presents an otherwise very interesting analysis of Prokofev’s use of tonality in Peter and 
the Wolf. In two Tonnetz fgures Cohn swifly establishes that in the opening presentation of Peter’s theme, 
the harmonic action mostly takes place outside the ‘walled garden’ of diatonic tonality. Te garden is 
Cohn’s metaphor for Peter’s bourgeois existence in a big house with a surrounding wall; it is also his 
metaphor for diatonic tonality, and one I should like to examine. As the Tonnetz diagram reproduced in 
Fig. 1 illustrates, Peter’s theme tends to wander up and down two ‘hexatonic alleys’, C major to A<fat> 
major/minor to E<fat> major to B minor, and so on (there are three alleys, one each for tonic, dominant 
and subdominant, which are bound by thick lines and run diagonally from top right to bottom lef). Te 
harmony spends less time in the ‘comfortable bourgeois home’ (p. 53) than in ‘the chromatic forest’ (p. 55),
and Cohn concludes of the piece as a whole that ‘the more perilous or fantastic the circumstance, […] the
more indeterminate the consonant status of the local triad, and the more insecure its relation to the 
global C-major tonic’ (p. 61). Te argument has a certain basic appeal, and it is certainly true that there is 
a lot of hexatonic activity in this piece. But if we exchange Cohn’s metaphor for another, we might decide 
on a diferent appraisal of the nature of tonality – not just in this piece, but more generally.
<INSERT FIGS 1 AND 2 NEAR HERE>
Fig. 2 ofers what Cohn does not: an elementary Schenkerian analysis of bars 1–9, the same ones 
written into Cohn’s Tonnetz. Just as defnitively as Cohn’s analysis shows diatonicism being troubled by 
hexatonicism, a Schenkerian reading shows hexatonicism submitting to diatonic order. Te opening nine
bars establish a Kopfon G which is prolonged by motion to and from a lower-neighbour F<sharp> in bar 
7. A skip to a covering C in bar 3 enables a chromatic decoration as the bass arpeggiates to <fat>III in 
bar 5, en route to the dominant in bar 8. A chromatic passing note in an inner-voice third descent, from E
(bar 2) to E<fat> (bar 4) to D (bar 7) to C (bar 9), lends a hint of tonicisation to the modally mixed 
arpeggiation, but otherwise the piece begins in a strongly – and quite conventionally – defned diatonic 
space. Rather than leaving home, we could instead suggest that the boundaries of what constitutes home 
have simply expanded. Substituting an imperial metaphor for Cohn’s bourgeois-garden one, we might 
note the interesting coincidence in the nineteenth century of a development in European tonal harmony 
(the embrace of new chromatic possibilities for symmetrical division of the octave)  and European 
politics (the rapid growth of empire). Both tonal and political empires grew in this period to become 
more various, less monoglot, more favoured by spice from the colonies. Musical pieces continued to start
and end in the tonic and to have subdominant and dominant functions, but chords I, IV and V (Great 
Britain, France and Germany, in terms of the political metaphor) may have their own hexatonic colonies 
(Cohn’s ‘alleys’). Te imperial centre of tonality could therefore always assure total control over these 
spaces at the same time that it allowed music to move quite freely through them all. 
Viewing Peter and the Wolf by the light of this alternative metaphor, in which ‘home’ is not fxed 
but an expanding imperial centre, we might instead conclude that there is no sense of the unheimlich here,
or at least no more of an unheimlich feeling than the British upper class ever felt in Delhi. Instead of 
conceiving of this kind of tonality as leaving the security of home for the wilds of the forest, we might 
instead decide either that the chromatic colonisation does not threaten the diatonic imperial centre, or 
even that any attempt to escape from the tonal symbolic order would require rather more extreme 
measures (such as outright rejection of every tonal impulse whatever). In the frst scenario, it would seem
that the process of chromatic colonisation merely disguises the hegemonic diatonic order, beguiling the 
incautious observer into thinking that centrifugal forces have genuinely replaced centripetal ones, with 
the efect of destablising or even overturning the structural order. But if instead hexatonicism is 
considered not a hegemonic challenge to tonality, but simply a pursuit of colourful novelty, it would seem
additionally to create another historic and cultural parallel with capitalism’s confguration of public and 
aesthetic space in terms of commodifed novelties. Te question of twentieth-century tonality’s place in 
the Adornian struggle between the culture industry and modernism would therefore reopen in 
interesting ways. 
Cohn’s unheimlich hexatonic ‘poles’ are, I suggest, ultimately ‘problems’ which can be comfortably 
accommodated within tonal structures. Both Cohn’s Tonnetz (and more generally his hexatonic reading) 
and my Schenkerian graph are distortions of the opening of Peter and the Wolf which fail to properly 
acknowledge the dialectical tension in the music – and specifcally a negative dialectics in Adorno’s sense, 
since these two positions mediate each other forever, refusing to form a synthesis. It is the nature of 
modernist tonal music to move perpetually between the poles of integration and disintegration and to 
settle in each case on an individual accommodation which is more or less ‘conservative’ or ‘radical’. Cohn’s
hexatonic theory, along with other non-diatonic theories, should therefore be a vital part of the analyst’s 
tool kit when examining twentieth-century tonal music; but I suggest that it should always be used in 
conjunction with Schenkerian analysis. 
Te chapter which comes closest to the kind of dialectical method that I fnd most persuasive for 
understanding rather than simply describing twentieth-century tonality is Philip Rupprecht’s analysis of 
Britten’s ‘triadic modernism’. He pays particular attention to Britten’s Sextet, written by the sixteen-year-
old composer as ‘a Schoenbergian experiment, a path not taken’ (p. 231), and songs from Les Illuminations 
(1939), in which Mahler and Shostakovich have replaced Schoenberg as infuences. Te earlier work 
establishes important patterns for understanding the later, specifcally in Britten’s presentation of triads. 
Rupprecht writes that ‘even in [the Sextet‘s] strikingly chromatic milieu, Britten continues to defne tonal 
arrivals at pivotal moments of the form, though major-minor resources – actual triads – play very little 
role as local harmonies’ (p. 230). If my argument (and Schoenberg’s, and Schenker’s) is right, and tonality 
has an ideological force, then even sparse use of triads will be sufcient to maintain the hegemony – in 
just the same way that an election every four or fve years is enough to sustain modern parliamentary 
democracy. Citizens do not need to cast votes every week (the equivalent of a perfect cadence every eight
bars in a piece of music, say) in order to maintain order: democracy is such a strong ideology that it can 
survive on the very merest food, and any doubt that citizens live in a properly democratic society is 
swifly dismissed by the blithe reassurance that they get to step into the voting booth around a dozen 
times in their adult lives. Just how many triads are necessary to sustain tonality? (Krenek would probably 
answer ‘one’.)
Rupprecht’s analysis of ‘Villes’ is particularly sophisticated, and the fgure reproduced as Fig. 3 
summarises some of its central claims. Te song is saturated with two tonal gestures that Rupprecht calls 
‘GLITTER’ – a shif from major to minor, or vice versa, and back: ‘a consecutive, self-reversing instance of
Cohn’s P (Parallel) function’ (p. 235) – and ‘SHIMMER’ – a linear variant of GLITTER, which unfolds a 
major/minor shif with a string of chromatic passing notes. Both are shown in Fig. 3, in simple form at (c)
and as part of the progression of bars 1–14 at (a). Rupprecht’s graph combines elements of centrifugal 
and centripetal motion, expressed in a very loose Schenkerian form with considerable non-diatonic 
complications (he calls it ‘a proto-Schenkerian attempt to distinguish dependencies from more structural 
pitches’, p. 235). But in the Cohn manner he also presents a tabulation of motions in hexatonic space (his 
Fig. 1 on p. 236), with arrows pointing, for instance, G major←B major↔B minor (for GLITTER), and so
on (this corresponds to what in Fig. 3 is shown between bars 1 and 5). Tis reads more like an inventory, 
with chords ticked of as being present and connected, than an analysis: it is not clear from this kind of 
representation whether there is any sense of centring, or whether there is simply an assumption that 
there is not one. Te ‘proto-Schenkerian’ reading, however, problematises this assumption. Rupprecht 
argues that across bars 1–14 Britten presents, in a very light-touch manner, a progression from I to V, 
admitting as he does so that many theorists would be resistant to the functional implications of these 
ostensibly rather isolated chords. But if tonality inheres in music with the force of an ideology, it is 
legitimate to ask, with Rupprecht, whether these two chords are sufcient to ground the song tonally. 
Ultimately he does not favour an integrative or disintegrative reading, which seems to me to be a highly 
sensitive response to the music of the song.
<INSERT FIG. 3 NEAR HERE>
In other chapters, the ‘meanings’ that hexatonic motions are supposed to carry (of which Cohn’s 
Unheimlichkeit is the one most usually invoked) tend to be assumed more than interrogated. In analysing 
Ravel, for instance, Volker Helbling refers liberally to tetrachords and trichords, which in their very 
language – redolent of the analysis of free atonal music – presupposes a post-tonal interpretation which 
is not checked by any thoroughgoing investigation of tonal implications. Similarly, while Alain Frogley 
remarks that we fnd in Vaughan Williams’s style afer the 1920s a ‘fnely balanced dialectic between 
diatonic tonality and various anti-tonal elements typical of mid-century modernism’ (p. 188), his analysis
omits the Schenkerian methodological pole, and thus a genuine dialectics is not possible. In its place we 
have alternatives, with no way of judging the nature or ultimate outcome of their interaction, and with 
the presumption, as with other contributors, in favour of a too easy decentring of tonality and the 
certainty of the by now familiar Cohnian unheimlich (‘a twilit second movement, in which hexatonic 
elements evoke well-established associations with the uncanny’, p. 199).
One of the principal strengths of this frequently fascinating collection is its focusing of the question of 
how tonality could participate in early twentieth-century modernism. Even where I am frustrated by the 
methodological oversimplifcation of several chapters, I fnd much to stimulate thought in virtually all of 
the contributions. Albeit tentatively, I suggest that the book enables us to dare some possible answers to 
questions of meaning in the tonal music of 1900–1950: the frst decades in history when composers 
could choose whether or not to write music which had a conception of consonance and dissonance. 
However diferent their responses to this challenge were, all the composers whose music is examined in 
this volume decided to stick with the consonance/dissonance binary and to reject the full revolutionary 
force of a new music which could declare both consonance and dissonance invalid as concepts. Yet even 
the most contrary composers, such as Harris, were conditioned by that revolution, compelled to respond 
to it, however strenuously they might have denied any conscious decision at all. If we are to glimpse 
whatever meaning may emerge from this music, it is vital that the state of the dialectic of tonal and non-
tonal elements be grasped both analytically and hermeneutically.
By way of conclusion, I would suggest that one useful way of parsing the language of twentieth-
century art music is by reference to linguistic mood. From this perspective, the music that we mostly call 
‘modernist’ (a set whose members include Schoenberg, Berg, Webern, Berio, Nono, Ligeti, Lachenmann, 
Boulez, Birtwistle, Ferneyhough, and so on) is mostly in the imperative, and music which is more or less 
tonal (broadly, the music which provides a focus for this book) is in the subjunctive. Tere is an immediate
problem here. In some languages, including English, those two moods can be distinguished from each 
other only by reference to context. So, for instance, the words ‘be radical’ could be either in the imperative
– if they constitute the entire utterance – or in the subjunctive – if the full utterance is ‘it is important 
that you be radical’. Te frst sentence carries the force of a command, while the second carries a burden 
of doubt or uncertainty. Similarly, in twentieth-century music, an ordered succession of twelve notes will 
carry the force of the imperative if it is used in a symphony by Webern, but should be understood in the 
subjunctive, with an expression of doubt as to its ontological reality, where it is placed in a tonal context, 
for instance in the Barber Nocturne that Harrison examines. Te words alone do not communicate their 
meaning; their signifcation drifs unmoored. Only when the shifing signifers are brought into contact 
with others can a meaning be ‘quilted’, in Lacan’s sense, and retrospectively created for the utterance. And, 
once again, in music it is not necessarily the notes or chords but their context alongside others which 
fxes their signifcation in a range of ‘purely musical’, historical, psychological and hermeneutic senses. 
Any study of tonality in twentieth-century art music which aims to assess that system of musical 
organisation in a way that clarifes questions of history, aesthetics, or the efects on (or of) a listener must 
therefore keep that complexity – the fact that the notes alone will not aid in the parsing of an utterance – 
at the forefront of the investigation. And that is why, ultimately, mere description, Erklärung, will not do: 
for an understanding, Verstehen, we urgently need to turn our attention away from detail and on to 
context, and then to move incessantly between the two, judging the dialectical interaction of both 
mutually mediating poles.
I cannot decide whether it would please him or not, but I feel certain that if we are to properly 
understand either the organisation or the meaning of post-Schoenbergian tonality, we need to return, 
rigorously, to Schenker.
J. P. E. HARPER-SCOTT
NOTES
1. Arnold Schoenberg, Teory of Harmony, trans. Roy E. Carter, 2nd edn (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2010; originally published as Hormonielehre, 1911), and Paul 
Hindemith, ‘Sterbende Gewässer’, in Aufsätze, Vorträge, Reden, ed. Giselher Schbert (Zürich: 
Atlantis, 1994; frst published 1963), pp. 314–36.  
2. See Daniel J. Boorstin, Te Americans: the Colonial Experience (New York: Random House, 1958), 
Te Americans: Te National Experience (New York: Random House, 1965) and Te Americans: Te 
Democratic Experience (New York: Random House, 1973).
3. As so ofen, the assumption that ‘technology’ is a twentieth-century, gadget-centred phenomenon
goes unquestioned. Music has been mediated by technology at least since the dawn of notation.
4. Walter Benjamin, ‘Te Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in Hannah Arendt 
(ed.), Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn (New York: Schocken, 1969; frst published 1936), pp. 217–
51.
5. For an introduction to sound studies, see Jonathan Sterne (ed.), Te Sound Studies Reader (New 
York: Routledge, 2012).
6. Tomas Piketty demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that what seemed like the 
Götterdämmerung of the elites and the democratisation of wealth in the early twentieth century 
was just a blip: in the long run, capitalism simply reconfgured itself and by the start of the 
twenty-frst century has restored the status quo ante of the belle époque (Capital in the Twenty-
frst Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). Te 
strong return of tonal tendencies in the work of highly preferred composers today such as 
Tomas Adès, Julian Anderson, George Benjamin, Nico Muhly and others can appear to make 
the history of tonality take on, from this perspective, a similar cyclical form.
7. Heinrich Schenker, Harmony, ed. Oswald Jones, trans. Elisabeth Mann Borgese (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1954; originally published as Harmonielehre, 1906).
8. Scheideler invokes Adorno to make a similar argument, in his case in defence of Hindemith’s 
tonal practice (p. 220).
9. Tis is something I argue at much greater length in Te Quilting Points of Musical Modernism: 
Revolution, Reaction, and William Walton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
especially in Ch. 5.
10. Teodor Adorno, Dissonanzen. Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 2nd edn, 
Gesammelte Schrifen 14 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), pp. 143–67.
11. On centripetal and centrifugal forces, see Carl Dahlhaus, Between Romanticism and Modernism: 
Four Studies in the Music of the Later Nineteenth Century, trans. Mary Whittall (Berkeley and 
London: University of California Press, 1980), where he suggests that the Tristan Prelude is 
centrifugal and Brahms’s First Piano Concerto is centripetal (p. 74).
12. My dissatisfaction with the term ‘conservative’, which is ofen used to describe tonal music in the 
twentieth century, is perhaps sufciently indicated by the scare quotes. For an elaboration of the 
model I present here for distinguishing between diferent dialectical forms of musical material, 
see again Harper-Scott, Te Quilting Points of Musical Modernism, Ch. 5, in which Alain Badiou’s 
theory of the Event, and the ‘faithful’, ‘reactive’ and ‘obscure’ responses to it, is applied to music 
since 1900.
13. Sigmund Freud, Tree Essays on the Teory of Sexuality, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic 
Books, 1962; originally published as Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, 1905).
14. Darius Milhaud, ‘Polytonalité et Atonalité’, La Revue musicale, 4/iv (1923), pp. 29–44.
15. Charles Koechlin, ‘Évolution de l’harmonie: Période contemporaine, depuis Bizet et César Franck
jusqu’à nos jours’, in Albert Lavignac and Lionel de la Laurencie (eds), Encyclopédie de la musique 
et Dictionnaire du Conservatoire, 2 ptie., Technique – Esthétique – Pédagogie (Paris: Delagrave, 1925), 
pp. 591–760. 
16. Cohn cites his own ‘Uncanny Resemblances’ as an important source. ‘Uncanny Resemblances: 
Tonal Signifcation in the Freudian Age’, Journal of the American Musicological Society, 57 (2004), pp.
285–323.
17. Te practice I urge here is not entirely at odds with what Wörner describes as the Kurthian 
‘“intuitive” approach’, which, by ‘avoiding categorization in favor of an ofen-metaphorical 
elucidation, shows how tonality works when conceived as a fexible, context-dependent, and 
psychologically-infuenced feature’ (p. 136).
NOTE ON CONTRIBUTOR
J. P. E. HARPER-SCOTT is Reader in Musicology and Teory at Royal Holloway, University of London. He 
has written widely on music in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His most recent book is Te 
Quilting Points of Musical Modernism (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and a study of Berlioz and love 
is forthcoming in 19th-Century Music.
[CAPTIONS]
Fig. 1 Prokofev, Peter and the Wolf: Peter’s theme on the Tonnetz, with hexatonic alleys (Cohn’s Ex. 3, from
p. 55). Reproduced by kind permission of Franz Steiner Verlag.
Fig. 2 Prokofev, Peter and the Wolf: foreground graph of Peter’s theme
Fig. 3 Britten, ‘Villes’ (Les Illuminations, 1939): motive and harmonies at the opening (Rupprecht’s Ex. 2,
from p. 234). Reproduced by kind permission of Franz Steiner Verlag.
